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THE BONN CONSTITUTION AND THE EUROPEAN
DEFENSE COMMUNITY TREATIES
A Study in Judicial Frustration
BY KARL LOEWENSTEINt-
ON the same day, August 30, 1954, the European Defense Community suc-
cumbed in the French National Assembly,' a momentous legal controversy
became a simultaneous casualty of the French refusal to ratify the EDC
treaties. 2 While the failure of EDC, considered by the United States a major
aim of its foreign policy, was accorded in this country the attention it deserved,
the coincidental demise of the legal proceedings passed unnoticed by the
American public. These proceedings had been instituted, in January 1952,
before the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe against the coalition
government of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer by its political opposition, the
tWilliam Nelson-Cromwell Professor of jurisprudence and Political Science, Amherst
College. Member of the Massachusetts Bar. The author filed an opinion with the Federal
Constitutional Court in the constitutional controversy discussed in this article at the request
of the Social Democratic Party on October 28, 1952. See 2 DR IC%!rsF rizn Wiu:n-
BEITRAG 337401 (Institut fuer Staatslehre und Politik, ed. 1953).
1. N.Y. Times, Aug. 31,1954, p. 1, col. 8.
2. EDC was composed of three treaties: (a) the Convention on Relations bet-ween the
Three Powers and Related Conventions, signed by the German Federal Republic, France,
the United Kingdom, and the United States at Bonn May 26, 1952 [cited hereinafter as
Bonn Treaty], which was designed to restore the sovereignty of Western Germany; (b)
the treaty on The Creation of the European Delense Conmnnity signed by the German
Federal Republic, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg in Paris, May
27, 1952, [cited hereafter as EDC Treaty], which attempted the integration under supra-
national authorities of the military potential of the six signatories; and (c) the Convention
between the Member States of the EDC and the United Kingdoon, also signed in Paris,
May 27,1952.
The Bonn Treaty, a document of 225 pages in folio, had two annexes, one dealing with
the assistance of the Federal Republic for Western Berlin, the other with the Arbitration
Tribunal. Additional conventions were attached to it: Convention on the Rights and Ob-
ligations of Foreign Forces and their Members in the Federal Republic of Germnany;
Finance Treaty; and Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War
and the Occupation. The EDC Treaty, a document of 121 pages in folio, included eight
protocols, dealing, among others, with military, financial, and judicial matters. Attached
were various other treaty instruments, concerning, e.g., the relations of EDC to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization and the relations of EDC to the United Kingdom.
The treaties, with all protocols and conventions, as signed by the Federal President
March 26, 1954, are published in full in [1954] BUNDESGESETZ11LATr, pt. 2, at 57-436. The
English text of the Bonn Treaty, and an English translation of the EDC Treaty may be
found in S. Ex.- Doc Q & R, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952). For a more accurate translat-,n
of the EDC Treaty see OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE IN EuR on,
TREATy ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEN DEFNxSE COMMUNITY AND RELATED PuTOLOLS
(1953).
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German Social Democratic Party. The opposition contested the constitution-
ality of the treaties-and the conventions and protocols attached to them-
under the provisions of the Bonn "Basic Law" (Grundgeset-).a This challenge
produced a constitutional controversy rivaled in importance in recent German
history only by the decisions of the Reich Constitutional Court of the Weimar
Republic rejecting the claim for reinstallation of the Government of Prussia,
which had been removed by a coup d'etat of von Papen's Reich Government. 4
The scars left on German constitutional democracy by the inconclusive termina-
tion of this legal dispute are perhaps more lasting, and of greater consequence
to the United States, than the alleged damage European unity has suffered
by the failure of EDC.5
During the life of the constitutional struggle, its significance escaped the
American lawyer and political scientist because of the overriding political
importance of West German integration into EDC. Now that German partici-
pation in the defense of the West has been accomplished, at least for the time
being, by the replacement of EDC with the Paris Accords of October 23, 1954,0
it seems desirable to summarize and evaluate some of the procedural and sub-
stantive issues before the Federal Constitutional Court.
Consistent with German procedural technique, the proceedings, extending
over a period of nearly three years, consisted primarily of weighty briefs by
the parties. Oral proceedings were as brief and intermittent as they were
inconclusive. Briefs for the Government were drafted by the staffs of the
ministerial bureaucracy, primarily the Federal Ministry of Justice. The legal
burden of the opposition was carried Atlas-like by Dr. Adolf Arndt, a Social
Democratic representative in the lower legislative chamber, the Federal Assem-
bly, with the help of one legal assistant. In addition, some thirty opinions
(Gutachten) were submitted to the Court by some of the most respected
German constitutional and international lawyers. 7 Each of these briefs and
3. The Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany-the "Bonn Constitution"-
was adopted at Bonn by a Parliamentary Council of sixty-five German political leaders on
May 23, 1949. [1949] BUNDESGESETZBLATT, pt. 1, at 1. For a translation, see U.S. Dr,'T
OF STATE PuB. No. 3526, EUROPEAN AND BITIsH COMMONWEALTH SMal 8 (1949). The
translations used in this article are those of the author.
4. Judgment of Staatsgerichtshof, Oct. 25, 1931, 138 Entscheidungen des Reichs-
gerichts in Zivilsachen, Anhang 1*.
5. See Loewenstein, The Union of Western Europe: Illusion and Reality, 52 Cotut.
L. Ray. 55, 209 (1952) ; Loewenstein, European Union: Miracle or Mirage, The Nation,
Jan. 10, 1953, p. 26.
6. See text at notes 124-25 infra.
7. Practically all were Weimar-trained university professors, and the majority had
taught under Weimar, retained their positions under the Hitler regime and continued to
hold their chairs under the Bonn system. Two foreign experts wrote opinions (Professor
Wehberg, Geneva, and the author). The briefs and opinions submitted in 1952, amounting
to some 800,000 words, were published in two volumes, DER KAMPY UM DEN WumFim;TRA(,
(Institut fuer Stantslehre und Politik, ed. 1952-53) [cited hereinafter as WsnuFrnrR~Al.




opinions were written with traditional German legal scholarship and emphasis
on the general theory and the systematization of law, and with a full aware-
ness of the historic implications of the controversy. In addition to domestic
constitutional law and international law, both parties supported their arguments
by exhaustive references to the constitutional theory and practice of the United
States and other democratic nations. Indeed, comparative material was used
to such an extent that one was almost able to discern the contours of a constitu-
tional law common to all democratic states.
Yet this immense intellectual effort was for practical purposes entirely
wasted. The Federal Constitutional Court never decided the issue of the
compatibility of the treaties with the Bonn Basic Law on its substantive merits.
As the controversy drew one governmental organ after another into its vortex-
the Federal Government, the Federal President, both houses of the Federal
Parliament (Federal Assembly and Federal Council)-the Court deliberately
and consistently procrastinated until the negative vote of the French National
Assembly relieved it of the duty of decision. In this sense the controversy
is a case of judicial frustration for which a parallel can scarcely be found in
modern legal history.
The proceedings fall into three distinct though interrelated stages. The
first covers the petition of the opposition to the Court to enjoin the Federal
Government from signing the treaties then under advisement and to declare
that they were incompatible with the Constitution. The petition was rejected
on procedural grounds on July 30, 1952.8 The second stage, the so-called pro-
ceedings through legal opinion (Gutachtcnvcrfaircin), deals with the request
of the Federal President for an advisory opinion of the Court on the constitution-
ality of the treaties. This phase was ended by the withdraw-al of the President's
request on December 9, 1952.9 The final stage, in which the Court was not
asked to participate, concerns the passage of an amendment to the Basic Law
on March 26, 1954, which purported to remove the constitutional objections
of the opposition to the treaties. But before further discussion of the action--
or inaction-of the Constitutional Court, some understanding of the institu-
tional organization of judicial review under the Basic Law is necessary.
Judicial Review under the Bonn Constitution
Under the Basic Law exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether federal
-or state-law is compatible with the Constitution (Normcn!kontrolle) lies
in a special court, the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverassungsge-
riclt).10 Whenever any German judge entertains doubts as to the consti-
8. Judgment of Bundesverfassungsgericht (I. Senat), July 30, 1952, 1 Entscheidungen
des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [hereinafter B.V.G.] 396; 1 ,VEHRLEITRAG 436.
9. 2 WF-nRBFIRAG 811.
10. BAsic LAw art. 93(2). For a detailed description see Loewenstein, The Govern-
ment and Politics of Germany, in Go-axzNmE--rs oF CONTr.ENTA. EunOIu 3S9, 85-90
(Shotwell rev. ed. 1952). For a historical summary of German judicial review frem the
Bismarck to the Bonn Constitutions see Nagel, Judicial Review in Germany 3 Am. J.
CoT. L. 233 (1954).
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tutionality of a statute which he must apply in the controversy before him,
he is required to suspend the trial and request a decision of the Constitutional
Court." This same action must be taken by the court of last instance in non-
constitutional matters, the Supreme Federal Court. 12 Judicial review is thus
strictly separated from the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts and monopolized
by the Constitutional Court. In addition, the Court is charged with numerous
other judicial functions, including the determination of "disputes concerning
the extent of rights and duties of the highest federal organ, or of other
participants accorded independent rights by this Basic Law .... ."3 In practice
such disputes may arise between the Government and the parliament, between
the two houses of parliament, and between the Federal President and other
federal organs. Most such disputes would be non-justiciable "political ques-
tions" in this country.
In conformity with Basic Law article 94(2), the Lav on the Federal Consti-
tutional Court, a complex federal statute of more than one hundred sections,
was passed March 12, 1951, 4 to regulate the appointment, by elective pro-
cedures, of the justices and the internal organization of the Court. Basic Law
article 94(1) prescribes only that the Constitutional Court shall consist of
"federal judges and other members" and that one-half of the justices shall be
elected by the lower parliamentary house, the Federal Assembly (Bundestag),
and the other half by the upper house, the Federal Council (Bundesrat).
The statute fixes the number of justices at twenty-four 'r and establishes
elaborate precautions against political interests influencing the selection of
justices: a complicated procedure of indirect election of justices is required
in the Federal Assembly ;", for those elected by the Federal Council a two-
thirds majority is required.17 Obviously, when parliamentary bodies have
the power to make appointments, political considerations cannot be completely
eliminated. Nevertheless, all of the justices elected are trained lawyers of
recognized standing, among them some of the best legal minds of Germany.
The Law on the Federal Constitutional Court divides the court into two
chambers- Senates -of twelve justices each, under the presidency of the
Chief Justice and the Deputy Chief Justice respectively.' 8 Section 13 dis-
tributes the jurisdiction of the Court, as defined by Basic Law, between the
two Senates. Neither Senate can assume jurisdiction over a category of dis-
11. BASic LAW art. 100.
12. Id. arts. 95, 100.
13. Id. art. 93(1) para. 1. See, also, id. art. 93(1) paras. 3, 4, 5.
14. Gesetz ueber das Bundesverfassungsgericht, Law of March 12, 1951, [1951] BuN-
DESGESETZBLATr, pt. 1, at 243 [hereinafter cited as Law on the Federal Constitutional
Court]. The leading commentary on the statute is by one of the justices of the Court,
GEIGER, GES=rE uEBR DAS BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT VOM 12. MAERZ 1951, KOMMENTAR
(1952).






putes assigned to the other. The First Senate, thus, has exclusive jurisdiction
over disputes involving the compatibility of federal and state law with the
Basic Law. 19 The Second Senate alone may hear questions regarding the
interpretation of the Basic Law that arise in disputes between organs of the
federal government.20 The Court was duly constituted in 1951 in Karlsruhe.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURE AND POLITICS
The Preventive Injunction
Although the plan for EDC was originated by the French Government in
1950 and closely followed the pattern of the Schuman plan for the merger,
under supranational authorities, of the coal and steel potential of the six
western European states-at that time still in the preparatory stage-drafting
the EDC Treaty proved immensely difficult and protracted. On January 30,
1952, when the outlines of the organization had become sufficiently dear, 144
members of the Social Democratic Party, the constitutionally required one-
third of the Federal Assembly,2' petitioned the Constitutional Court to issue
a preventive injunction (vorbeugende Nornenkontrollc), decreeing that the
participation of German nationals in a military establishment, without an ante-
cedent amendment of the Basic Law, was unconstitutional. After the Chan-
cellor had signed the treaties, on May 26 and 27, 1952, the petition was
amended by a prayer to enjoin their ratification by the Federal Assembly. -2
In the most general terms,2 the constitutional objections of the opposition
were based on the absence in the Basic Law of any provisions regarding
military matters, and particularly on the absence of a military power in article
73, which enumerates the powers of the federal government. The opposition,
therefore, contended that before German military contingents could be con-
scripted and transferred to the EDC,2 4 an amendment to the Basic Law,
authorizing the federal government to establish military forces, was indispens-
able. For such a constitutional amendment the consent of the Social Demo-
cratic Party was required, since the coalition parties did not command the
two-thirds majorities in both legislative houses required by the Basic Law.25
The opposition, however, was unwilling to approve the amendment because
it believed Germany's integration in a Western military alliance would block
permanently reunification with Eastern Germany, at present under Soviet
control. Moreover, the action of the opposition was motivated by a strong
desire to -maintain constitutional legality in the clear recollection that consti-
19. Id.§13paras.6,14(1).
20. Id.§13paras.5,14(1).
21. BASIc LAw art 93 ()para. 2.
22. Ratification of treaties by the federal legislative bodies is required by BAsIC LAW
art. 59(2).
23. A fuller discussion of the substantive issues appears infra pp. 817-2.
24. BAsic LAw art. 24(1) authorizes the Federation to "transfer sovereign pljwers tu
international institutions."
25. BA sIc LAw art. 79(2).
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tutional illegality had doomed the Weimar Republic and opened the door for
Hitler.
The First Senate of the Constitutional Court, after oral proceedings, rejected
the petition for a preventive injunction on July 30, 1952, on the ground that
judicial review lies only against statutes which have been formally enacted
by the parliamentary assemblies.2 With this decision no fault can be found.
A bill in statu nascendi is not yet a legislative act on which a court can pass,
however certain may be the knowledge of its eventual contents and passage.
Request of the Federal President for an Advisory Opinion
On June 10, 1952, the Federal President, Dr. Theodor Heuss, requested
the Constitutional Court to render an advisory opinion as to whether the ED(
Treaty, insofar as it authorized German participation, was compatible with the
Basic Law. Subsequently, on August 3, 1952, this request was extended to
include an opinion on the Bonn Treaty and its "Related Conventions." The
request was based on section 97 of the Law on the Federal Constitutional
Court which, going beyond the text of the constitution, authorizes the Federal
President, the Federal Government, the Federal Assembly and the Federal
Council to request advisory opinions. The section stipulates that such an
opinion must be rendered by the plenary Court-by all twenty-four justices
sitting en banc. However, the statute left open an important question: whether
the advisory opinion of the plenary Court is binding on either of its Senates
when considering an identical legal issue raised in a subsequent controversy.
In requesting an advisory opinion the Federal President acts on his own
initiative, and does not need the counter-signature of the Government other-
wise mandatory for all presidential acts.2 T President Heuss, one time professor
of political science and a man of vast learning, evidently believed that he could not
sign and promulgate 28 the treaties when passed by the legislative bodies without
the legal advice of the highest judicial organ of the land. The Basic Law
leaves no doubt that even the antecedent counter-signature of the Government
on a statute does not relieve the President of his responsiblity to satisfy himself
that the legislative enactment is in conformity with the Constitution. 2  A
statute altering the Constitution, if passed by simple majorities of the parlia-
mentary assemblies instead of by the two-thirds vote required for constitu-
tional amendment,30 obviously would be unconstitutional.
The months following the presidential request were the most dramatic in
the checkered history of the treaties. In a battle of bulging briefs the Govern-
26. Judgment of Bundesverfassungsgericht (I. Senat), July 30, 1952, 1 B.V.G. 396;
1 WEERBEITRAG 436.
27. BAsic LAW art. 58. See note 32 infra.
28. BAsic LAW art. 82(1). Promulgation (Ansfertigung) is the formal certification
by the Chief of State, customary in parliamentary countries, of the completion of the legis-
lative process in conformity with constitutional requirements; it is requisite for publication.
29. BAsic LAw art. 82(1). See yoN MANOLDr, DAs BONNER GRuNDGEsorz, KOm-
MENTAR 442 (1953).
30. BAsicLAw art. 79(2).
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ment showered the Court and the plaintiffs with a barrage of legal arguments,
which the opposition struggled to counter by mobilizing experts in constitu-
tional and international law. Moreover, the dispute took a political turn when
members of the Government publicly denounced the Federal President for
interfering with the Government's conduct of foreign policy even though his
legal right to request an advisory opinion could not be contested.3 ' The
immediate result of this attack was that the President, whose political neutrality
is carefully safeguarded by the Basic Law,32 was drawn into the political
arena and the prestige of the office placed in jeopardy.
The Court, after various requests by the Government lawyers for postpone-
ment, finally set December 8, 1952, as the date for the oral proceedings on the
President's request. On December 9, 1952, before beginning the oral argu-
ments, the Court announced a resolution of its plenary session that an advisory
opinion rendered by the plenary Court is binding on both Senates. There-
after, on the motion of the Government, oral proceedings were adjourned to
the afternoon of December 10, 1952.
On the morning of this day the Court was notified of the withdrawal of the
Federal President's request for an advisory opinion3 4 The reason given was
that since the opinion of the plenary Court was to bind both Senates, it would
be tantamount to final disposition of the case, contrary to the "advisory"
character of the opinion requested.
For an understanding of this sudden turn of events the political background
must be sketched in. During the preceding months influential organs of public
opinion had indulged in allegations that the First Senate - which by statute
had assumed jurisdiction over the petition of the plaintiffs from the beginning
31. The author, in the summer of 1953, was granted an interview with Dr. Heuss and
is convinced that the President was acting with the highest motives.
32. BASic LAw arts. 54-61 endow the Federal President with far less pvwer than hi.
counterpart under Weimar. He is elected by a special body, Bundesversanudihig, cJmp,.'sCd
of the Federal Assembly plus an equal number of ad hoc electors chosen proportiimnally by
the Laender. BAsic LAw art. 54. The Federal President has no real political rower: his
functions are representative, state-integrating and ceremonial, as the Chief of State of a
parliamentary republic. Political leadership is vested in the Federal Chancellor, whose
counter-signature the President must obtain for all official actions ecept the appintment
and dismissal of the Chancellor and in special circumstances the dissolution of the Federal
Assembly. Id. arts. 58, 63(4). Likewise free from control by any other federal organ, the
President has a duty to promulgate statutes enacted in accordance with the provisions of
the BAsic LAw. Id. axt. 82(1). The first Federal President, Dr. Theodor Heuss, was
elected in September 1949, and reelected by an overwhelming majority in July 1954.
33. Resolution of Bundesverfassungsgericht (Plenum), Dec. 8, 195-9, 2 B.V.G. 79; 2
WERBEITRAG 812. The decision was 20 to 2. One of the dissenting justices, Dr. Geiger,
author of the authoritative commentary on the Law on the Constitutional Court, tco!r the
unusual step of making public his dissenting opinion, despite the fact that by Law Qn the
Federal Constitutional Court § 30(1) the Court decides in camera. See 2 NVurxrrnA4;
822. The decision produced a vast literature: see Federer, Die Rechisprechung des Burdes-
verfassungsgerichls mun Gnundgesetz fucr die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 3 JAurucu
DES OEFrxTLiCHEx REcHTs (Neue Folge) 15, 53 n.31 (1954).
34. 2 WEHRBEITRAG 811.
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- was "red," with a majority favoring the opposition, while the Second
Senate was said to be "black," with a conservative majority leaning toward
the Government. The Government, instead of countering these speculations,
permitted no less an official than the Federal Minister of Justice, Dr. Thomas
Dehler, publicly to impugn the neutrality of the Court. Thus, in addition
to the Federal President, the Court was drawn into the conflict of party
politics and its usefulness as the highest judicial organ seriously impaired.
Of political bias on the part of the Court or its individual members not the
slightest evidence was presented.
Apparently the Government and its lawyers had convinced themselves that
a majority of the plenary Court would declare the treaty bills unconstitutional
and thus bind both Senates. It cannot be established definitely that the Presi-
dent was induced by the Chancellor to withdraw his request, but the press re-
ported that Dr. Heuss was put under heavy pressure by Dr. Adenauer. 36 What-
ever its underlying causes, the withdrawal of the presidential request brought
with it a collapse of the advisory stage of the controversy.
The resolution of the Court that a plenary advisory opinion is binding on
both Senates is subject to grave legal doubts.80 Neither the Basic Law nor
the Law on the Federal Constitutional Court requires that this effect be given
an advisory opinion. By statute the two Senates are constituted as independent
judicial agencies with mutually exclusive jurisdiction. An advisory opinion
of the plenary Court would not seem to be a substitute for the final judgment
of the authorized Senate in an actual controversy. Only if the two Senates
should come to conflicting decisions on an identical issue, would a final
decision by the plenary Court be in order.
Strange Interlude: The Government's Motion to Curb the Opposition
On December 5, 1952, the Federal Assembly passed, in the second reading,
the treaty ratification bills by simple majorities 3-an event which was followed
by one of the strangest motions ever lodged before a court of law. The next
day the Government filed a petition with the Second ("black") Senate on behalf
of the three coalition parties and "the majority of the Federal Assembly,"
consisting of 203 deputies, acting individually and collectively, against the
Social Democratic party and 127 of its individual members. The petition
sought judicial declarations that the defendants violated the Constitution in
contesting the right of the Federal Assembly and its majority to ratify the
35. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1952, p. 5, cols. 1-2; id. Dec. 11, 1952, p. 16, cols. 3-4.
36. The author is inclined to agree with the dissent of Justice Dr. Geiger.
37. The vote was 217 to 164 for the Bonn Treaty and 215 to 165 for the EDC Treaty,
with 4 abstentions in both cases. 14 STExOGRAPHIScnE BnIcwTE, VERIIHANDLUNGEN DES
D uTscHEN BUNDESTAGES, 1. WAHLPERIODE 11528-29 (1952). The vote was strictly par-
tisan, the coalition of the Christian Democratic Union (Adenauer's party), the Free Demo-
crats, and the German Party voting for, the Social Democrats and a few members of some
minor parties voting against.
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treaties by a simple majority vote; and that the Federal Assembly had the
right (berechtigt) to pass the treaty bills by simple majority under article
42(2) of the Basic Law. The reason why the Government chose now to cast
the legal issue of the constitutionality of the treaties in terms of a dispute be-
tween governmental organs is to be found again in politics. The jurisdiction
of the Second ("black") Senate extends to constitutional questions arising from
disputes between the highest federal organs.3 8 A petition to the Second Senate
is authorized only "if the petitioner claims that he or the federal organ of
which he is a part, suffers a violation of his rights under the Basic Law or if
his rights are seriously endangered by an action of the defendant."30 Realizing
that it could not win a favorable decision from either the plenary Court or the
First Senate, the Government sought, by petitioning what it believed to be
a friendly court, to establish indirectly the constitutionality of the treaties
and to enjoin the opposition from exercising its right to oppose. During the
oral proceedings, in late February 1953, the petition was enlarged by a
request for a judicial declaration that legislative action taken on the second
reading and action still to be taken on the third reading do not require a con-
stitutional amendment, and that after passage of the bills by simple majorities,
the Federal President is obligated to promulgate the treaties without further
inquiry into their constitutionality.
On March 7, 1953, the Second Senate rejected the petition in a decision
which can vie with the classics in democratic jurisprudence.40 The right of
the petitioners as Assembly parties to bring suit 41 was not contested, but the
Court vigorously denied the right of the parliamentary majority, a strictly
political phenomenon without legal capacity, to petition the Court. The Court
reasoned that a statute is enacted by the Federal Assembly as a constitutional
organ, not by its majority, and refused to take legal cognizance of the fact that
under the iron discipline of the Government the majority would pass the bills
on the third reading. The Court was no more patient with the contention
of the petitioners that the opposition of the opposition prevented them from
freely exercising their parliamentary mandate. Trenchantly it wrote:
"It is not only the right of the opposition to make knovm, in addition
to their political, also their constitutional objections, but this is, in the
parliamentary-democratic state, its duty . . . .There exists neither the
legal right of the parliamentary majority to impose its legal viewpoint
within the parliament, nor does an obligation exist of the minority to
submit to the legal viewpoint of the majority."' 2
It is a revealing reflection on the depth of penetration of the democratic spirit
in postwar Germany that the Government and its subservient coalition believed
38. BAsic LAw art. 93(1) para. 1 ; Law on the Federal Constitutional Court §§ 14(l),
13 para. 5.
39. Id. § 64.
40. Judgment of Bundesverfassungsgericht (II. Senat), March 7, 1953, 2 B.V.G. 143.
41. Law on the Federal Constitutional Court § 63.
42. Judgment cited supra note 40, at 170-71.
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that the authoritarian principles of command and obedience could be legally
grafted onto the parliamentary system.
The Controversy before the Federal Council
Now the spotlight shifted from the halls of justice to the political
arena. On March 19, 1953, the treaty bills were passed by a majority of the
Federal Assembly in the third reading with the same alignment of parties as
before.43 The question arose of what the second chamber, the Federal Council,
would do.
Unlike the second chamber in most federal states the Federal Council 4'
is composed of representatives appointed by the Land governments and in-
structed how to vote. In most cases these instructions follow the party line
of the appointing Land government. Also unlike most federal states the repre-
sentation of the Laender in the Federal Council, instead of being equal for
each constituent unit, varies, in keeping with the German tradition of "federal-
istic arithmetics," from three to five votes according to population. 4 Further-
more, the votes of a Land cannot be split but must be cast as a unit."0 The
Basic Law makes the Council the guardian of states rights by giving it a
veto power (Einspruch) over statutes affecting states' rights.47 A Council
veto can be overridden by a majority of the Federal Assembly if the Federal
Council has vetoed by simple majority, but only by a two-thirds majority of the
Assembly if the Council -has vetoed by a two-thirds majority. 4"
The Federal Government wished to avoid submission of the bills to the
Federal Council because at that time it did not command the reliable majority
there which it possessed in the Federal Assembly. Socialist governments, or
at least coalition governments in which Socialists occupied the leading position,
were in power in several Laender, controlling twenty 49 of the thirty-eight
votes in the Council. The key position in the Federal Council was held by
Baden-Wuerttemberg,5 0 with five votes, whose Minister President, Dr. Rein-
hold Maier, a lawyer and at that time Chairman of the Council, had announced
43. 15 STENOGRAPEISCHE BERicHTE, VERHANDLUNGEN DES DEUTSCIIEN BUNDLSTAGES,
1. WAHLPERIODE 12366 (1953).
44. BAsIc LAw art. 51(1). For a more detailed description of the organization of the
Council, see Loewenstein, The Governent and Politics of Germany, in GovwrNMrNTs or
CONTINENTAL EUROPE 571-73 (Shotwell rev. ed. 1952).
45. BAsic LAW art. 51(2).
46. Id. art. 51(3).
47. Id. art. 77(3).
48. Id. art. 77 (4).
49. Baden-Wuerttemberg and Lower Saxony (five votes each), Hessen (four), and
Hamburg and Bremen (three each). It was known that the Socialist Land Governments
were not all of one mind concerning EDC - for example, the government leaders in Ham-
burg and Bremen, Herr Brauer and Kaisen, were in favor of EDC - but the iron dis-
cipline of the party made them toe the line.
50. Baden-Wuerttemberg had been reconstituted, in 1951-52, by a merger of three
smaller and formerly separate state entities. See Leibholz, The Federal Constitutional
Court in Germnany and the "Southwest Case", 46 AMI. POL. Sci. REV. 723 (1952).
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officially his grave doubts concerning the constitutionality of the treaties.r' In
the face of such obstacles the Government contended that the treaties did not
affect states' rights and, therefore, need not be submitted to the Federal
Council.
Steered skillfully by Dr. Maier, the Council, on April 24, 1953, sidestepped
the issue by voting, twenty to eighteen, to take no action on the treaty bills--
that is, neither to approve nor to reject them formally-until the Court had
rendered an advisory opinion on their constitutionalit,. -2 Politically, Dr.
Maier had no other course: by throwing his five votes to the opposition, he
would have voted himself out of his party; by voting for the treaties he would
have driven the Socialists from his coalition and possibly voted himself out of
his job. Dr. Maier argued convincingly that, if both houses passed the bills by
simple majorities, and afterwards the Court found them unconstitutional,
the parliament as a whole would suffer an irreparable loss of prestige. The
crucial issue, therefore, whether the treaties required formal action--either
approval or rejection-by the Council, was left open.
The Chancellor was thus left free to attempt to force the hand of the Federal
President who, under article 82(1) of the Basic Law, must sign and promul-
gate statutes enacted in conformity with the provisions of the Basic Law.
However, as early as March 1953, President Heuss, a proven democrat, had
committed himself to the leader of the opposition, Erich Ollenhauer, not to
sign the treaties before the Court had attested their constitutionality. Dr. Heuss
refused to break this promise.
The request of the Federal Council for the advisory opinion of the Court
sent the treaties back to the Assembly. Under section 97(1) of the Law on
the Federal Constitutional Court a request for an advisory opinion requires
the joint motion of the Assembly, the Council, and the Government. The
coalition parties of the Assembly did not accede to the request of the Council,
for an opinion rendered by the plenary Court was as unwelcome to them now
as it had been at the time of the President's request. The Chancellor's next
move was political. To break the hostile majority in the Federal Council he
tried to wean the smaller parties away from the coalition in Lower Saxony and
install a coalition government in that Land favorable to his policies. In this
he failed. The issue was deadlocked.
But in the labyrinth of German politics the constitutional screw vras soon
given a new turn. Dr. Karl Arnold, Minister President of North Rhine-
Westphalia and a powerful leader of the Adenauer party, moved for a recon-
sideration of the treaty bills in the Federal Council. Following a scheme
invented by Dr. Hans Ehard, Minister President of Bavaria and leader of
the Christian Social Union, which is allied with the Adenauer party, the
Federal Council on May 15, 1953, reversed its previous decision to take no
51. Dr. lMaier himself belongs to the left wing of the conservative Free Democrats,
the second strongest party in Dr. Adenauer's coalition. His cabinet was composed of five
Socialists, two other Free Democrats and one member of the German Party.
52. N.Y. Times, April 25, 1953, p. 1, col. 7.
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action on the bills. Instead, it resolved that the two treaties themselves did
not directly affect states' rights and, therefore, that they had been enacted
when passed by the Assembly. No Council action, positive or negative, was
taken on them. However, certain provisions of the technical conventions at-
tached to the treaties were found to affect states' rights and to require formal
approval by the Council. 3 This was granted by a majority of twenty-three to
fifteen.54
This action of the Council completed the legislative stage and ended the
parliamentary struggle over the treaties, at least for the time being. But the
basic issue of the constitutionality of the treaties was no closer to resolution.
Moreover, the Socialist opposition in the Federal Council announced that it
would contest, before the Court, the validity of the course taken by the Council
on the ground that the Council was obligated to approve or disapprove the
treaties. Thus, a new and difficult issue was added to the ample pile of contro-
versies saddled on the Constitutional Court. Meanwhile, the treaties were laid
to rest on the desk of the Federal President for his signature. This was not
to come for almost another year.
The Frontal Attack of the Social Democratic Party
On May 11, 1953, 147 members of the Federal Assembly, including the
entire Social Democratic Party and a few members of smaller parties outside
the government coalition, constituting together more than one-third of the
Assembly, petitioned the Constitutional Court for a decision on the consti-
tutionality of the treaties now formally ratified by the legislative assemblies.
Though no formal steps were taken, this petition in fact superseded the original
complaint of the opposition which all the time had remained undecided on the
docket of the Court. At long last a direct attack on the treaties was permissible
under the previous decisions of the Court, by which it had held that it could
not pass on constitutionality before the legislative stage had been completed.65
Although the treaty statutes had not yet been formally promulgated by the
Federal President, the Court had indicated that it would take the issue under
judicial consideration without the presidential signature, which itself awaited
the Court's decision.
Plaintiffs, in two massive briefs, marshalled their assault batteries in three
53. These were: Agreement on the Tax Treatment of the Forces and their Memibers,
signed at Bonn, May 26, 1952 (as amended by the protocol signed at Bonn, July 26, 1952).
and Convention on the Rights and Obligations of Foreign Forces and their Members li
the Federal Republic of Germany, signed at Bonn, May 26, 1952. N.Y. Times, May 15,
1953, p. 1, cols. 3-4, p. 5, cols. 5-6.
54. N.Y. Times, May 16, 1953, p. 1, col. 3. The dissenting minority was composed of
the Laender Lower Saxony (five votes), Hessen (four), Bremen and Hamburg (three
each). Dr. Maier joined the majority with his five votes. Id. at p. 5, col. 5. He may have
felt that by separating the treaties from the technical conventions the legal requirements
were satisfied and that the fate of his coalition would be decided anyway by the general
elections for the Federal Assembly scheduled for autumn of 1953.
55. See text at note 26 supra.
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groups. In the first place they contended that the Federal Council erred
constitutionally in approving the several conventions implementing the treaties
because various provisions deviated from the Basic Law and, therefore, would
have required acceptance by qualified majorities and verbal insertion into the
text of the Basic Law.5c Secondly, plaintiffs argued that the treaty bills them-
selves, which the Federal Council had neither approved nor rejected because
they were held not to affect states' rights, actually did affect states' rights, and
that, therefore, the bills were unconstitutional on procedural grounds. Legal
logicians would say that the plaintiffs' contention resembled an argument that
the egg came before the chicken: if they were right in contending that the
legislative process had not been completed, their constitutional challenge was
premature under the earlier decisions of the Court. Finally, the plaintiffs
restated and amplified their earlier substantive objections to the constitutionality
of the treaties under the Basic Law.
It was expected that the Court would at long last proceed to decide on the
merits whether the treaties were constitutional, but it assiduously continued to
mark time and act as patient recipient of an avalanche of briefs and legal
opinions hurled at it by the Government and the opposition. Erudite and
comprehensive as they were, they contained little of new substance. One is
reminded of Goethe's epigram: "Getretener Quark wird brcit, nicht star."5 1
Yet the reluctance of the Court to decide the case at long last is easily under-
stood: with the general elections scheduled for September 6, 1953, the Court
did not wish to risk a conflict with the verdict of the political sovereign on
the treaties.
However, one important event did occur during this judicial stall. Under
an order of the Court the Government submitted the texts, some only in draft
form, of five agreements implementing the treaties which, though kept secret
up to that time, were ex post facto to be included in the treaty-statutes. The
parliamentary bodies had thus ratified agreements which they never saw, a
revealing reflection on executive-legislative relations in the German democracy.
THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
The division of the substantive issues into five "areas of problems" sug-
gested by the Court in preparation for the oral proceedings in December 1952 08
will, for convenience, be followed here in what must be a highly selective dis-
cussion of nearly two million words of legal briefs.
Was the controversy "justiciable"?
A prima facie doubt had to be resolved. Was the decision requested
of the Court a legal one or was it political ? In the United States the courts
56. BAsicLAw arts. 79(1), (2).
57. "When stirred up cream cheese becomes broader but does not stiffen:'
58. See 2 VEHRBEIRAG 802. The court enumerated no fewer than 37 different legal
issues to be argued. See also Government brief of August 12, 1953, pp. 15-61; and Social
Democratic Party briefs of December 30, 1953, pp. 8-58, and January 13, 1954, pp. 15-58.
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would have refused to adjudicate some of the major issues under discussion as
non-justiciable "political questions," e.g., the relations between the majority
and the minority of the parliamentary bodies, the conformity of the legislative
procedure with the constitution, or the extent of the treaty-making power of
the government. But under the legal system established by the Bonn Con-
stitution, the existence of political and, hence, non-justiciable controversies
(justizfreie Hoheitsakte, actes de gouvernment) is not recognized." Further-
more, the problem in Germany is far greater than merely finding reasonable
limits for judicial review. It goes to the roots of prevailing German political
philosophy. Under the Empire, the government when exercising sovereign
powers (Hoheitsakte) of the state was considered superior to the judiciary.
Weimar attempted to subject political dynamics as far as possible to judicial
control. In turn Hitler's acts of personal despotism were rationalized, by
legal science and the courts, into positive law beyond judicial challenge. 0
In understandable reaction, the Bonn Basic Law went to the extreme to
"judicialize political power."'' The entire range of potential political conflicts be-
tween the highest state organs was deliberately brought under the purview of a
judicial agency whose members were carefully selected in such a way as to
insure their political neutrality. The catalog of constitutional disputes within
the jurisdiction of the Court is practically exhaustive. 2 Despite the fact
that the decision requested of the Court, in its immediate and ultimate effects, was
of paramount political importance, the parties were in substantial agreement
that the issue was basically, under the terms of the Constitution, a legal
question determinable by the Court.6 3 Nonetheless, it is well to recognize
that the controversy was doomed to run headlong into the difficulties inherent
in resolving political issues through the application of legal norms.
Status of the Federal Republic
The first "area of problems" concerned the character of the German Federal
Republic as a state (Staatscharakter) and its capacity under domestic law
59. A recent decision of the Supreme Administrative Court of Western Berlin of Sep-
tember 26, 1952, [1953] JURISTENZEITUNG 644, would concede the existence of non-justi-
ciable questions only for "a political act on the highest political level," such as declaration
of war, recognition of a foreign government, or dissolution of parliament. But even a dis-
solution could be challenged as illegal under the Basic Law.
60. See, e.g., IPSEN, POLITIK UND JUsTIz (1937). For the recent change in atti-
tude, see SCHNEIDER, GERIcHTsFREIE HOHEITSAKTE (1951). For a restatement of the
French theory and practice of actes de gouvernuent, see Eisenmann, Gerichisfrcie Hohelit-
sakte im heutigen franzoesschen Recht, 2 JAHRI3UCH DES OEFENTLICHIEN RECIITS, (Neue
Folge) 1 (1953).
61. But see, e.g., the pertinent doubts of WEBER, WEIMARER VERFASSUNG uND BONNER
GRUNDGESETZ (1949); Loewenstein, Justice, in GovwR-iNG POSTWAR GERMANY, 236, 202
(Litchfield ed. 1953).
62. BAsIC LAW art. 93.
63. Non-justiciability of the controversy over the EDC treaties was claimed by Apelt,
Ist der Streit un die Verfassungsmaessigkeit des EVG-Vertrages eine Streitligkelt ins
Sinne des Art. 93 GGF, 6 NEUE JUsisIscHE WOCHENSCHRr'r 641 (1953).
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to conclude an international treaty integrating Western Germany into a
military alliance for a fifty year period. If Western Germany possessed this
capacity would the treaty bind all of Germany when and if unification took
place? The Bonn Treaty envisaged extension ("crstrccken") of the rights
the Federal Republic had obtained under the EDC Treaty to a unified
Germany if the latter were willing to assume the treaty obligations." The
opposition interpreted this provision as hampering the free decision of a unified
Germany to remain in, or to leave, the Defense Community. On the basis of
the language of the treaty, this argument is not convincing.
The issue was tied directly to the legal problem, much discussed since the
Basic Law was adopted in 1949, as to whether the Constitution will extend
automatically to all of Germany after unification, or whether a Constituent
Assembly elected by all Germany will have to draft a new instrument. On
this point the Basic Law is rather ambiguous. Article 23 stipulates that the
Basic Law applies, for the time being (zunaechst), to the Laender of Western
Germany named therein--optimistically, if unrealistically, Greater Berlin is
included-and provides that it "shall be put into force for other parts of Ger-
many [meaning the Eastern Zone] on their accession." Two other Basic
Law provisions are relevant. The preamble states that "the German People"
of the Laender constituting the Federal Republic "have acted also on hehalf of
those Germans to whom participation was denied," and article 146 announces:
"The Basic Law shall become invalid on the day when a constitution adopted
in a free decision by the German people comes into force." Government and
opposition were agreed that the Federal Republic could not legally make
territorial decisions which would be binding on a unified Germany: this, for
example, is the unanimous attitude taken in the Saar dispute with France r and
the reasoning applies with equal force to the territories forcibly ielded to
Russia and Poland.
Under these circumstances, could the Government of the Federal Republic
mortgage the future of a unified Germany by integrating Western Germany
into the Atlantic defense system? This the opposition emphatically denied,
though at first some rather far-fetched arguments were mustered to support
the position: The Federal Republic was said to be merely a "fragment" of a
state, not a full-fledged sovereign state, and the Bonn instrument, merely a
provisional and transitional organization statute, not a full-fledged constitution
(Vollverfassung) .0o Most of these arguments were compromised by agree-
ment of the parties on the following points: (a) The Federal Republic was
not a new state which came into existence upon unconditional surrender, but
64. Bonn Treaty art. 7, § 3.
65. The international position of the Saar is a most controversial subject. See, e.q.,
Menzel, Die Diskussion ueber die gegcnwacrtige Recltsstellnng des Saarlandes, 9 Eunoi.%
A.RcHrV 6599 (1954).
66. The term "Grundgcsetz" was originally chosen by the Parliamentary Council
drafting the Basic Law to indicate that Germany, under the occupation, was not s, vereign
and that, instead of a genuine constitution, all that could be created was an organizatkin
statute.
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was the legal continuation of and successor to the Reich ;67 (b) the Basic Law
is a complete constitution and not a provisional, transitory, or fragmentary
organization statute; (c) the territory of the German Federal Republic as
established by the Basic Law is identical with that of the German Reich as of
1937 (prior to the Austrian Anschluss) and includes the territory of Eastern
Germany.
But on the crucial issue whether the Federal Republic could act interna-
tionally on behalf of Eastern Germany irreconcilable disagreement persisted.
While asserting that the Federal Republic is the only legal state within the
territory of Germany, the opposition nonetheless denied that the Western
German government is the only government. The Pankow regime of Eastern
Germany was at least a de facto government. Thus the Federal Government
lacked legal capacity to conclude an international treaty of such importance;
only an all-German government selected by all German voters would be able
to do this. The legal arguments of both parties are basically political, evidenc-
ing a common desire for unity and a refusal to accept a schizophrenic Germany.
Yet realistically, neither argument has compelling validity. The jurisdiction
of the Federal Republic ends at its eastern border on the Elbe. The claim of
the Federal Republic to speak internationally for eastern Germans is no better
founded than similar claims of the East German government, for neither is
truly representative of the people of all Germany.
The genuine patriotism of the opposition should not be minimized, but
the political stimulus for its legal position is apparent. Traditionally the
Socialists drew their main voting strength, apart from the Ruhr, from Berlin
and the industrialized sections of the East. Free elections in a unified Germany
might well bring into power a Social Democratic Government with a foreign
policy opposed to integration in any international alliance.
On the whole, the round fought over the first "area of problems" ends even.
Military Sovereignty and Military Puwers of the Federal Republic
The second and third "areas of problems" can be treated together. They
center on the twofold question whether Western Germany, under international
law, possesses "military sovereignty" (the most approximate though still in-
adequate translation of "Wehrhoheit") and, whether, under national law, the
exercise of military powers (Wehrgewalt) belongs to the federal state or the
Laender. In other words, is the right to establish national military forces an
inalienable attribute of sovereignty per se, or does military sovereignty require
specific arrangements and assignments of military power in the national con-
67. This issue seems settled by a decision of the Supreme Federal Court of July 14,
1.953, 6 NEuE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 1705 (1953). The Federal Constitutional
Court, by repeated decisions and resolutions, adhered to the position that the Federal Re-
public is the legal successor of the German Reich under constitutional and international
law. See Federer, Die Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts zull Grundgesetz




stitution? As could be expected, German legal science had a field day with
the elusive concept of "sovereignty."
The Bonn Constitution failed to mention a military establishment (except
by certain oblique references) and, in particular, failed to include military
powers in the otherwise exhaustive catalog of exclusive federal powers in
article 73. When the Parliamentary Council, closely supervised by the Occupa-
tion Powers,6s drafted and adopted the Basic Law, the general aversion
to a revival of German militarism was shared by the Germans. Consequently
-and the debates of the Parliamentary Council leave no doubt on this point C0.
military powers were deliberately omitted from the Basic Law.
The Government, however, argued from various indirect references that
the Basic Law implicitly assumed the establishment and maintenance of mili-
tary forces. Article 4(3) guarantees as one of the fundamental human rights,
the right of the conscientious objector not to be compelled to bear arms. The
Government maintained that if the constitution protects the right of the con-
scientious objector, by arguinenturn e contrario it authorizes conscription. This
provision, however, was merely a product of the pacifistic mood prevailing
at that time in Western Germany. It may also have been designed to preclude
conscription of German nationals as mercenaries of the Occupation Powers.
Article 26(1) makes "preparing for aggressive war" a criminal offense. From
this provision the Government argued that, if a war of aggression is specifically
prohibited and punishable, by implication a war of defense is legal, and for this
purpose military forces are authorized. Quod crat deinonsirandum. Finally,
article 140 of the Basic Law incorporated by reference five articles of the
Weimar Constitution, among these, one, article 141, reaffirming the exercise
of religious freedom in hospitals, prisons, and other public institutions and
in the army. Hanging the mighty German Wchrmacht on the flimsy peg of
an obvious drafting oversight alluding to army chaplains was the only comic
relief offered in an otherwise bitterly fought controversy.
Well aware that these oblique references constitute a shaky constitutional
basis for a federal military establishment, the Government relied primarily on
legal arguments based on Western Germany's status as a sovereign state,
recognized at least since the so-called Petersberg Protocol of November 22,
1949.70 Under international law every sovereign state has the right of self-
preservation and self-defense and to that end the right to arm itself.1 This
68. See Loewenstein, The Governmnat and Politics of Gerinany, in Gov,..,rs o
Commrr.&,. EuaoPE 589 vt seq. (Shotwell rev. ed. 1952).
69. See 43d Sess. of the Main Committee of the Parliamentary Council, Jan. 18, 1949,
SrvoGPAmscnm BmzicHE 35.
70. The text of the Petersberg Protocol is found in GoE.RNInG Posrxavn Gmumny
619 (Litchfield ed. 1953).
71. See, e.g., Draft Declaration of the Rights and Duties of States, art. 12, in Inter-
national Law Commission, Report, U.N. GENERAL ASSEM=3LY OF'. REC., 4th Sess., Supp.
No. 10 at 8 (Doc. No. A/925) (1949); 1 FAUcHILLr, TrAITk m Dr-oi INT-rATIONAL
PuBLIc § 242 (Sth ed. 1922) ; HALL, INTRNATioNAL LAw c. 7 (8th ed., Higgins 1924) ; 2
OPPENHmEI, INmNAT wOAL LAw 156-57 (7th ed., Lauterpacht 1952).
1955]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
rule of international law is recognized in article 51 of the United Nations
Charter. Moreover, the Government found specific authority in the Basic Law
for application of the rule to Germany: article 25 incorporates the "general
rules of international law" into federal law with a rank superior even to fed-
eral statutes, and more specifically, article 24(2) authorizes the Federal Re-
public to integrate itself, for the preservation of peace, into a system of collec-
tive security. Participation in such a system allegedly would necessitate rearm-
inm. Hence, Western Germany is entitled, even duty-bound to rearm. The
failure of the Basic Law to include military matters among the federal powers,
the Government concluded, did not constitute a gap in the constitution
(Verfazssungsluecke) to be filled only by formal constitutional amendnient ;72
if such a gap did exist it was filled by the international status of the Federal
Republic as a sovereign state. Here the rights and duties of the state tnder
international law were equated with the rights and duties of the citizens under
domestic law.
So far so good. The opposition readily conceded military sovereignty
((Vehrhoheit) to the Federal Republic as a sovereign state. But this was not
a concession that the federal legislature is entitled automatically to establish
armed forces without a specific designation by the Constitution of who is to
exercise military power internally (Wehrgewalt). Nor was the opposition
willing to admit that conscription with its limitations on fundamental rights
could be effected without specific constitutional authorization. The opposition
refused to accept the Government's easy equation of military sovereignty of
the state in international law and the omnipotence of the federal legislature
in domestic law-which in practice means little less than omnipotence of the
Federal Government. The opposition strongly emphasized the fundamental
principle of the democratic-constitutional state: all government is composed
of constituted and limited powers, and the Basic Law is a comprehensive con-
stitution, which goes to the greatest length to enumerate all powers of the state
and to distribute them carefully between federal government and member
states. The legal legerdemain indulged in by the Government brings to the
surface an old stock-in-trade in German constitutional jurisprudence: a state
mysticism which believes itself entitled to create non-constituted governmental
powers by the invocation of a "natural law of the sovereign state." What the
positive constitutional law denies to the Federal Government it can obtain by
invoking principles of the general theory of the state allowing the sovereign
government to do everything it deems necessary for the welfare of the coni-
munity.
In this connection a great deal was made, by both sides, of the American
72. The problem of legal gaps in an otherwise codified order of law is a familiar pre-
occupation of German jurisprudence. It has its traditional roots in the strict subordination
of the judge under the positive law; and in constitutional law it is bolstered by the assump-
tion that a constitution, as a fundamental law, has the character of finality and comprehen-
siveness. On the Verfassrngsluecke under Weimar and in the general theory of the state,
see LOEWENST-EIN, ERSCHEINUNGSFORMEN DER VERFASSUNGSAENDERV.NG 122-28 (1931).
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constitutional theory and practice of "implied powers" (kraft Sachzusam-
-nenhang)73 and even of "resultant powers" rejected by the United States
Supreme Court in the steel seizure case.J4 But while in the steel case the
President based his action on powers implied from his function as commander-
in-chief and other specifically delegated powers, the Adenauer Government
claimea its right to establish military forces solely on the mystique of the
allegedly comprehensive (umnfassend) nature of state sovereignty.7 5
Finally, the Government's self-assignment of military powers ignores the
federal structure of the German Federal Republic. With ample reference
to comparative law material the Government argued that legislative powers
are by definition all-embracing and non-enumerable (unaufcachlbar), and that
no specific assignment is necessary for any specific legislative activity. Legisla-
tive omnipotence may exist in unitary states such as France or Great Britain,
but it is alien to states whose federal structure requires a delineation of
federal and state powers. The opposition showed that no contemporary federal
constitution failed to make an explicit assignment of military powers to either
the federal state, or the member units, or bothY6 In the absence of such a
specific authorization, they argued, a constitutional amendment was necessary.
The second and third rounds of the constitutional struggle, therefore, go
to the opposition.
Transfer of Sovereign Rights to International Organizatiuns
It is the fourth "area of problems" that contains the nub of the controversy.
It centers on article 24 of the Basic Law, which authorizes the Federal Repub-
lic to transfer "by statute" sovereign rights to international organizations
(zwischenstaatliche Einrichtungen) and to integrate itself, for the preservation
of peace, into a system of mutual collective security, consenting to such limita-
tions of its sovereign rights as lead to and secure a peaceful and permanent
order in-Europe and among the nations of the world. The core of the Govern-
ment's argument was that, in this process of transferring sovereign rights, the
Federal Republic is not confined to those rights specifically delegated to it
by the Bonn Constitution: rather, all rights inherent in the sovereign state
may be transferred by ordinary federal statute. Consequently, no constitutional
amendment was necessary to transfer military sovereignty to the defense
73. For a recent German discussion, see Kruse, Implied Powers und Implied Liwita-
tion , 4 ARcHlv DES VoELnE.mzaars 169 (1953).
74. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). The case was dis-
cussed for German lawyers in Loewenstein, Konflikte zwischen Regicrung u:d Jutsic, 78
ARcHiv DEs oEFEmx'u Eix REcHTS 260, 266-68 (1953).
75. Both parties, with widely different interpretations, exploited the case of United States
v. Curtis-Wright Export Co., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). The Government claimed that the
President exercised embargo rights by virtue of being the sole representative of the United
States in international law, while the opposition--correctly-referred to the specific d<k-
gation he had received from Congress.
76. See Legal Opinion of Professor Menzel, 1 ,WEURBEI AG 280, 311; Legal Opiniwi
of Professor Loewenstein, 2 WEHRBETAG 337, 347-49.
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community: article 24(1) operates in the place of an amendment and renders
it superfluous.
At first sight the Government's position finds support in the text of article
24(1) which authorized the transfer of sovereign rights "by statute" ("durch
Gesetz"). That these two words were not intended to remove the necessity
for a constitutional amendment before transferring a sovereign right not
enumerated among federal powers is apparent from the debates of the Par-
liamentary Council : 77 First, the words were designed to place an act of such
political importance beyond the power of the Federal President acting alone
as the international representative of the Federal Republic; they require legisla-
tive action-"by statute"--as is necessary for all international treaties regu-
lating the political relations of the Federal Republic.7 8 Second, the words were
intended to demonstrate the willingness and eagerness of Western Germany
to participate in efforts to promote international organization and peace: a
simple majority vote of the legislatures was made sufficient to enact a transfer
statute rather than the qualified majority needed for a constitutional amend-
ment. A motion to make transfer legislation dependent on the qualified majorities
required for constitutional amendment was rejected by the Parliamentary
Council .79
Altogether different, however, is the question whether a transfer statute
can transfer sovereign rights not mentioned in the constitution. The opposition
referred to Ulpianus' classicly formulated maxim, Nemo plus iuris ad alihm
tranferre potest, quam ipse haberet :80 if the military power does not exist
under the constitution, it is, a fortiori, not constitutionally transferable. By the
Government's interpretation, article 24(1) rises to the status of a super-
article, beyond the requirements of constitutional amendment, a sort of con-
stitution within a constitution. When prodded by the opposition, the Govern-
ment conceded that the super-constitutional attributes of article 24(1) find
their limits in the constitutional provisions unalterable even by constitutional
amendment :81 those dealing with the federal structure of the German Federal
Republic, the participation of the Laender in the legislative process, the dignity
of man, the rule of law, and the separation of functions. But with these ex-
ceptions the super-constitutional powers inherent in article 24(1)-exercised
by simple parliamentary majorities-were alleged to override all other funda-
77. For a review of the genesis of this clause, see voN MANGOLDT, DAs BoNNEmR GRUND-
GESETZ, KOmMENTAR 161-63 (1953).
78. BAsic LAW art. 59 (2).
79. See 6th Sess. of the Main Committee of the Parliamentary Council, Nov. 19,
1949, STENOGRAPHISCHE BzalcHr 69r, 70r (motion Seebohm), 29th Sess., SENoG.APu-
IscHE BERiCHTE 364r (motion Seebohm), and the contrary positions taken by the Deputies
Schmid and Eberhardt, leading to the rejection of the motion Seebohm, ibid.
For recent comparative material which demonstrates that other states, in the identical
situation of yielding sovereign rights to international organizations, require qualified
majorities in the parliament, see note 107 infra.
80. JUSTINIAN, DIGEST 50.17.54.
81. BAsic LAw art. 79(3).
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mentals of limited government including the regular process of constitutional
amendment.: The Government's case stood and fell on its interpretation of
article 24(1).
Another point argued at length by the parties wvas the character of EDC
as a "system of collective security" under article 24(2). The contention of the
opposition that EDC, including a rearmed Germany, increases the danger of
war and, therefore, is not conducive to collective "security," ws-as frankly
political. But with legal relevance the opposition pointed out that unarmed
nations may have a vital interest in joining a system of collective security,
and that the Grand Design of global collective security, the United Nations,
does not require military contributions from all its members. Article 43(1)
of the United Nations Charter, which envisaged the conclusion of agreements
with the member nations concerning military assistance, is a dead letter.
Furthermore, the United States saw no barriers to an attempt to bring a
constitutionally disarmed -82 Japan into the U.N.8
The fourth round likewise must be counted for the opposition.
The Theory of the "Electoral Mandate"
Little need be said about the fifth "area of problems" centering about the
opposition's allegation that since the remilitarization issue was not before the
voters in the 1949 elections, the Federal Assembly had no legal right to adopt
the treaties without first obtaining an electoral mandate for that action in a
general election. Invocation of the theory of the electoral mandate was inspired
by the constitutional theory and practice of Great Britain, although it has not
developed there into a genuine constitutional convention, and in recent times
has been as much ignored as observed.8 4 While other democratic states have
institutionalized the popular mandate by constitutionally requiring dissolution
of parliament and new elections as a condition of constitutional amendment,Sa
the theory has no basis in German constitutional law. Under article 79 the
legislative assemblies can pass constitutional amendments without calling gen-
eral elections.
The fifth round, thus, goes to the Government, which, however, did not
fail to claim that it had received an electoral mandate for EDC after its
overwhelming electoral victory in September 1953.
Specific Treaty Provisions in Conflict with the Basic Law
In a sizable number of instances the opposition raised constitutional objec-
tions to individual provisions of the EDC and the Bonn Treaties as deviating
from the Basic Law (Verfassungsdurchbrcchung). Any provision which did
82. JAPAN CoNsT. oF 1946 art. 9(2).
83. This attempt was frustrated by the Soviet Union in the Security Council, although
a favorable vote was subsequently rendered in the General Assembly. U.N. GE!2PL
AssEmmLy OFF. REc., 7th Sess., Plenary 479 (1952).
84. See, e.g., JENNINGS, PARLIAMENT 429-32 (1940).
85. See, e.g., BEI.GIUM CONs. art. 131; NETHERWa NDS CoNS?. arts. 202, 203.
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deviate from the Basic Law would have to be passed by two-thirds majorities
of both the Assembly and the Council, and then written into the text of the
Basic Law provisions it modified.8,6 The following will serve as illustrations
of the provisions said to conflict with the Basic Law.87
Article 12 of the EDC Treaty authorized the participating states to request
the Commissariat, EDC's "supra-national" authority, to permit transfer of
parts of the national military contingent to the home government when needed
to meet existing or threatened disturbance of public order. Such domestic
emergency powers, reminiscent of the ominous article 48 of the Weimar Con-
stitution, were deliberately denied the Federal Government under Bonn. The
opposition, therefore, argued that a treaty authorizing retransfer of military
powers from EDC to the Federal Government was equivalent to an assignment
of military emergency powers to the Federal Government. This would produce
a complete disequilibrium in federal-state relations which could be undertaken
only by constitutional amendment.
Article 9 of the Bonn Treaty established an Arbitration Tribunal with ex-
clusive jurisdiction over all disputes arising under the treaty or any of its
conventions between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic. The Arbitra-
tion Tribunal was authorized, in the case of the failure of a participating state
to comply with its decision, to issue orders binding on the delinquent state.88
The opposition alleged that this was a delegation of legislative powers in
violation of the separation of functions required by article 20(3) of the Basic
Law-a principle unalterable even by constitutional amendment 8 9
The Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and
the Occupation, attached to the Bonn Treaty, provided that the obligations
stemming from the confiscation of German assets abroad by the Allied Powers
during the war would be assumed by the German Government.90 Because no
provision was made to determine the "nature and extent" of compensation,
the opposition contended the treaty was in derogation of article 14(3) of the
Basic Law, which allows expropriation only under a statute determining these
matters and permitting appeal to the ordinary courts.
The Protocol on Justice, attached to the EDC Treaty, established the re-
sponsibility on the Community for injuries to individuals caused by its officials
in the exercise of their duties. 91 Special tribunals are established to determine
86. BASIC LAW arts. 79(1), (2).
87. See also Ehmke, Verfassungsaenderung und Verfassunqsdurehbrechung, 79
AacHIV DES OEFFENTLICHE REcHTS 385, 416-17 (1954).
88. Charter of the Arbitration Tribunal art. 11(6). (1954] BUNDESG SEZ LATT pt.
2, at 69-72.
89. BASIC LAW art. 79(3). Article 11 (6) of the Charter of the Arbitration Tribunal
makes the reservation that such legal regulations issued by the Tribunal must not be in-
consistent with the Basic Law. [1954] BUNDESGESE-ZBLAWr pt. 2, at 74-75. The legis-
lative functions assigned to the Tribunal, however, are themselves inconsistent with the
Constitution.
90. Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupa-
tion ch. 6, arts. 2-5. [1954] BUNDESGESETZBLATr pt. 2, at 202-04.
91. Protocol on Justice art. 1. [1954] BUDNDESGESETZBLATT pt. 2, at 390.
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the responsiblity for, and the amount of, damages, 2 and their decisions are
subject to immediate execution. 93 These arrangements, the opposition argued,
were in conflict with article 34 of the Basic Law which provides that the
ordinary courts cannot be deprived of jurisdiction in actions for damages
arising from acts of public officials.
The Convention on the Rights and Obligations of Foreign Forces and their
Members in the Federal Republic of Gernman, 4 attached to the Bonn Treaty,
authorized the extradition of members of Community forces who committed
criminal acts not only to their home state but also to the state to whose military
contingent they belonged. By this provision a German national, serving as a
member of the contingent of another EDC nation in Germany, could be extra-
dited to a foreign jurisdiction contrary to the blanket prohibition of Basic
Law article 16 against extradition of German nationals.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
This plethora of erudite legal arguments-and many more not discussed
here-were knocked into a cocked hat by the general elections for the Federal
Assembly on September 6, 1953. 9 Chancellor Adenauer's coalition obtained
307 of the 487 seats--only 18 seats short of a two-thirds majority-and the
Social Democratic Party with 151 seats no longer controlled one-third of the
Assembly. Whether the Chancellor's European policy or Germany's prosperity
under his leadership was responsible for his electoral success was much
debated at that time. Upon his re-election Dr. Adenauer proeceded to secure
the qualified majorities needed for a constitutional amendment to remove the
opposition's objections to EDC. This majority he achieved by including in his
coalition the All-German Bloc (Refugee Party) with twenty-seven seats.
In the Federal Council too the tables were skillfully turned on the oppositiun.
The major coup administered here secured five votes by breaking up the
government coalition in Baden-1Vuerttemberg. Dr. Maier resigned under
pressure and was replaced by a member of the Chancellor's party, while the
Socialists went into the opposition. With the subsequent victory by the slim-
mest of margins of a bourgeois coalition over the Socialists in Hamburg, three
additional votes were captured. The Chancellor now commanded twenty-six
against possibly twelve votes in the Council. 0 The stage was set for the
denouement of the constitutional deadlock.
At this point a description of the procedure of constitutional amendment
under article 79 of the Basic Law will be helpful.9 7 As was the case under
the Weimar Constitution, amendment requires passage of a formal statute by
92. Protocol on Justice arts. 10-16. [1954] BUNDESGMsETBLA-r pt. 2, at 392-93.
93. EDC Treaty art. 66.
94. [1954] BUNDESGESEMIBLATT pt. 2, at 78-134.
95. N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1953, p. 1, col. 3; id., Sept. 8, 1953, p. 1, col. 4.
96. The opposition retained Lower Saxony (five votes), Hessen (four votes), and
Bremen (three votes).
97. The text of article 79 is:
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a two-thirds majority in both Federal Assembly and Federal Council. But
the Basic Law adds two new procedures. First, article 79(1) makes it manda-
tory that the amending statute formally change the text of the apposite Basic
Law articles. This provision is hardly intelligible to foreign lawyers because
it seems self-evident. Its purpose is to forestall a repetition of the abuses of
the Weimar amendment procedure, where it had become customary to effect
constitutional amendments by statute passed by qualified majorities without
recording the change in the text of the constitution itself. This convenient
technique was often used by irresponsible ad hoc majorities to make exceptions,
in an individual case, to constitutional rules which on their face remained intact
(Verfassungsdurchbrechnnzg). Though persistently attacked on doctrinal
grounds, the process of "perforating" the constitution without changing its
text was tolerated by parliamentary practice. As a result within the short life-
span of Weimar the text of numerous articles failed to correspond to their
actual validity. This, in turn, greatly weakened the prestige of the constitu-
tion as fundamental law superior to ordinary legislation. Though the precise
number of such "perforations" was never officially established it ran into
several scoresY5
The second innovation of the amending procedure of the Bonn instrument
is to insulate certain fundamental principles of the Basic Law from any change
"(1) The Basic Law can be amended only by a statute which explicitly changes
or implements the text of the Basic Law.
"(2) Such a statute shall require the approval of two-thirds of the members of
the Bundestag [Federal Assembly] and two-thirds of the votes of the Bundesrat
[Federal Council].
"(3) An amendment to this Basic Law by which the organization of the Buind
[Federal Republic] into Laender, the basic principle of the participation of the
Laender in legislation, or the principles contained in Articles 1 and 20 are affected,
is inadmissible."
Article 1 refers to the "inviolate" "dignity of man" and proclaims adhesion of the
German people to the "inalienable" human rights. Article 20 establishes the German
Federal Republic as a democratic and social state under the rule of law, declares that all
state power emanates from the people, and creates a distribution of functions among federal
organs.
98. See LOEWENSTEIN, ERSCHEINUNGSFORMEN DER VERFASSUNGSAENDERUNG (1931) (a
monograph on constitutional amendment much referred to during the controversy). See
also Loewenstein, The Government and Politics of Germany, in GOVERNMENTS OF CONTI-
NENTAL EUROPE 432-34 (Shotwell rev. ed. 1952). The situation has no parallel in other
countries. The vast majority of amendments to the Constitution of 1874 of th Swiss Con-
federation pertain to the enlargement of enumerated federal powers. Under the Belgian
Charte of 1831. a parliamentary statute carried by simple majorities may occasionally be
in conflict with the text of the constitution, but the courts have never challenged it because
of the absence of judicial review. Altogether fourteen such cases in Belgium since 1851
are mentioned by Ganshof van der Meersch, De l'influence de la Conslitution dans la vie
politique et sociale en Belgique, 6 REVUE DE L'UNIVERSIrL DE BRUXELLES (N.S.) 169
(1954). In this country formal constitutional amendments are rare because the Supreme
Court, by interpretive adjustment of the verbal formulations of the constitutional text to
changing social conditions, performs some of the functions of the amendment process.
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whatsoever even by formal constitutional amendment."" These unalterable pro-
visions refer to the federal structure, the participation of the Laender in the
legislative process, the principles of the dignity of man, and the principle of
the state under rule of law (Rechtsstaat) as laid down in articles 1 and 20.
Unhappily, but perhaps inevitably, these noli me tangere are not concrete and
specific articles, but general principles subject to different interpretation.10
The Constitutional Amendment of lfarch 26, 1954: Passage
On December 4, 1953, two of the coalition parties set the amendment
machinery in motion by submitting to the Federal Assembly a draft constitu-
tional amendment which added to article 73 a "clarificatory" provision that
federal powers included jurisdiction over the military establishment, with the
power to introduce universal military service for all men eighteen years of
age.1 1 This textual amendment, filling the gap so conspicuous in the Basic
Law, met the demand of the opposition for an explicit assignment of military
powers to the Federal Government and placed on solid ground the right to
transfer military forces to an international organization under article 24(1).
However, an additional measure had to be taken to overcome the opposition's
objections that the treaties and the conventions attached to them contained
numerous deviations from the Basic Law which would likewise have to be
passed by qualified majorities and recorded textually in the document. The
Government would have found it very difficult and politically inopportune-
to say nothing of aesthetic awkwardness-to record in the text of the Constitu-
tion these deviations from articles otherise remaining intact. To circumvent
this embarrassing situation the constitutional amendment inserted an ingenious
escape-clause into article 79(1): In the case of a peace treaty, a treaty dis-
mantling an occupation regime, or a treaty for the defense of the Federal
Republic, deviations from the Constitution contained therein need not be textu-
ally recorded in the Basic Law; instead it is sufficient to add to the Basic Law a
"clarificatory statement" (Kiarstelunig) that the provisions of the Basic Law
do not prevent the conclusion and entering into force of the treaty. In other
words, any deviations from the Basic Law in a treaty of the specific kind are
legalized by declaring that they are not in conflict with the Constitution. Pursu-
ant to this provision the constitutional amendment proposed a new article,
142a, to be inserted into the Basic Law stating simply that the provisions uf
the Basic Law do not prevent the conclusion and entering into force of the
EDC and Bonn Treaties together with their conventions and protocols.'0 )2
99. BAsic LAw art. 79(3). See note 97 supra.
100. Such unalterable provisions inaccessible even to the formal amending prucess are
not altogether uncommon in constitutions. See, e.?i., FRANca CONST. OF 1916 art. 95; NX,-
wAy Co.xsT. oF 1814 art. 112. U.S. CoxsT. art. 6, cl. 3 may also be mentioned here.
101. DRUcKSACIHIE DEs BU DESTA;Es, 2. WAHLEUIOPE Nos. 124, 125.
102. The Protocol of July 26, 1952, [1954] BUoDESGEsmBzILAar pt. 2, at 340-41, abuut
which the parliamentary bodies were ignorant when voting on the treaty bills, was specifi-
cally mentioned in the new article 142a.
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Swift passage of the constitutional amendment by the legislative assemblies
was a foregone conclusion. On February 26, 1954 the Federal Assembly
passed it in the third reading with the requisite two-thirds majority.103 The
Federal Council rejected a motion to submit the matter to a reconciliation
committee of the two houses 104 and passed the amendment by the requisite
majorities with one Land (Hessen) dissenting from the entire amendment, one
(Bremen) abstaining from the vote on extension of federal jurisdiction to
military matters, and two (Lower Saxony and Bremen) abstaining from the
vote on the exemption of inconsistent treaty provisions from the requirement
of insertion into the text of the Basic Law.10 Despite the substantial vote in
favor of the amendments, serious doubts about their constitutionality were
raised by dissenting Land representatives and by others. 10 The amendment
entered into force on March 27, 1954.107
103. SITZUNGSBERICHTE DES 2. DEUTSCHEN BUNDESTAGES, 17th Sess., 552A-83A
(1954) ; DRUCKSACHEN DES BUNDESTAGES, 2. WAnLPERIODE No. 275 (1954). The vote was
334 to 144, with seven members excused. The coalition parties voted as solidly in favor as
the opposition against, and the two-thirds requirement was exceeded by nine votes.
104. Such committees are authorized by BAsic LAW art. 77(2).
105. 120. Sitming des Bundesrats, of March 19, 1954, SITZuNasoanDcnTE 59C-60A:
BUNDESRATS-DRUCKSACHEN Nos. 68/54, 68/1/54.
106. See 120. Sitzmg des Bundesrats of March 19, 1954, SiTzuxcsDrmucnr pp.
54C-60A.
107. Law of March 26, 1954, [1954] BuNDESGESETZDLATT pt. 1, at 45.
The increasing awareness of many nations since World War II of the importance of
closer international co-operation is reflected in alterations of their constitutions, which like
BAsic LAw art. 24(1) and the amendment of March 26, 1954, permit the transfer of sover-
eign powers to international organizations without constitutional amendment. These pro-
visions may be the first step in the breakdown of traditional, isolated state sovereignties
and the transition to a confederal system and eventually to a genuine federal union. See
Loewenstein, Sovereignty and International Cooperation, 48 Am. J. INT'L L. 222 (1954).
Both the French and the Italian constitutions authorize transfer of sovereign rights by
simple majority vote of the legislature and contain provisions similar to BAsIc LAW art.
24(1). FRANcE CONST. OF 1946 preamble; ITALY CoNsT. Or 1947 art. 11. French juris-
prudence accepts the doctrine that international law and international treaties may over-
ride domestic constitutional law. See, e.g., PINTO, ELEMENTS DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL
389 et seq. (1954) ; MIRKINE-GuETzf VITCH, DROIT CONSTITUTIONNFL INTERNATIONAL c. 5
(1933) ; Scelle, La Prtendue Inconstituionaltt Interne des Traitds, 68 REVUE DO DROrT
PuBLIc 1012 (1952). The Danish constitution authorizes the delegation to international
bodies of public powers held by state authorities provided the transfer is adopted by a five-
sevenths majority of the single chambered legislature or, that failing, by a referendum of
the people. DENMARK CONsT. OF 1953 arts. 20, 42. See Ribert, Danemark, La Constitution
du 5 jidn 1953, 70 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC 64 (1954). In order to participate in the Coal
and Steel Community, the Netherlands amended its constitution to permit transfer of
sovereign rights with the consent of two-thirds of the two parliamentary houses but with-
out the dissolution of parliament and confirmation by a newly elected parliament as is
required for constitutional amendment. STAATSBLAD VAN HET KONiNI.RIJK LfR Nzvri/-
LANDEN, No. 247, May 8, 1952. In Belgium the Christian Social Government, fearful that
its slim majority would be lost in the general elections required to effect a constitutional
amendment, put off amendment at the time of the adoption of the Schuman plan against
strenuous legal objection. See Ganshof van der Meersch, Le Plan Schuman et la Con-
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The next and final move was up to the Federal President. With the
adoption of the constitutional amendment the last barrier to his signing the
treaties was removed. The amendment released him from his commitment to
the leader of the opposition not to sign until the Court had passed on the con-
stitutionality of the treaties, and on March 26, 1954, the President attached hib
signature to the treaties.
Under the Occupation Statute any amendment to the Bonn Constitution re-
quired the approval of the High Commissioners of the United States, the
United Kingdom, and France, and any treaty with foreign powers could be
rejected by the High Commission within twenty-one days after its submission
to the Commission.1 03  On March 25, 1954, the High Commission approved
the constitutional amendment with a proviso, requested by France, that Ger-
man rearmament be postponed until all states participating in EDC had ratified
it. 109 The other sections of the constitutional amendment, being matters of
strictly domestic concern, were approved unconditionally. The treaties them-
selves were, of course, not objected to.
The Constitutional Amendment of March 26, 1954: Legality
Beginning with the publication of the draft constitutional amendment the
opposition fired broadside after broadside of briefs at the Court, sustaining
all previous substantive objections to the treaties and claiming, in addition, that
the constitutional amendment itself was unconstitutional.110 In fact, its legality
is subject to grave doubts.
The Government's attempt to disguise a constitutional amendment adding
military powers to federal jurisdiction as an innocent "clarification" or
stitution Belge, 4 REVUE DR L'UNIVERSITL DE BRUXELLES (N.S.) 5 (1951-52); Ganshof
van der Mfeersch, La Constitution Belge ct l'Evolution de 'Ordre International, 12 A.,-
xALEs DE DROIT ET DE ScIENcE PoLITIuE 33 (1952). But with the advent of EDC a c6n-
stitutional amendment could no longer be evaded. A proposal to amend the BELGium
CHARm OF 1831 arts. 25, 68 to permit the transfer of powers, particularly the military, to
international organizations was accepted by the legislature in March 1954; general elec-
tions were held April 11, 1954, and confirmation by the new parliament is safely to be
expected in the near future. See Orban, L'intgration Europe hnl el la rtE'i ion de la Con-
stitution Belge, 4 REVUE INTrRNATiONALE 'HisroiR PoaTiQuT Er Cour sTITIoTTEI
(N.S.) 21 (1954). No corresponding constitutional amendment was passed in Luxemburg,
though the Conseil d'Etat recommended it. See 2 WEHRBEITRAG 390.
The situation in the United States is in startling contrast to the European movement
toward opening constitutional portals to international integration. The controversy over
the Bricker amendment indicates an increasing desire to immunize our national sovereignty
against intrusions by international organizations. See Loewenstein, supra.
108. Occupation Statute of May 12, 1949, as revised March 6, 1951, art. 5, OMOAL
GAzETTE OF THE ALLIED HIGH CoMIssIoN rO GERm xy 13 (1949); as revised id. at
792 (1951).
109. Decision No. 29 of 'March 25, 1954, OFFICIAL GAzETrE OF THE ALLIED HiGi
CoMISSION FOR GEat=AiY 2864 (1954).
110. Legal objections to a constitutional amendment in the United States have been
raised but rarely, and never have been sustained by the Supreme Court. See Leser v. Gar-
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"authentic interpretation" seems a transparent political maneuver. The Gov-
ernment was understandably reluctant to concede to the opposition that an
antecedent constitutional amendment was indispensable for integrating Ger-
many's military potential into EDC. But there was more to it. By labelling
the addition a mere clarification and thereby implying that disposition of mili-
tary forces had been a federal power from the beginning, the Government
hoped to knock the legal props from under the suit still pending before
the Court. In short, it sought to give a constitutional amendment retroactive
force.:' The opposition argued-and it seems with a good deal of reason-
that article 142a, legalizing the unconstitutional provisions of the EDC treaties,
was also retroactive and as such violated the Basic Law. It is true that the
Basic Law enshrined only a prohibition against ex post facto penal law. ' '
But a fortiori this prohibition should apply to constitutional provisions, for
the non-retroactivity of fundamental legal norms is a basic principle of the state
under the rule of law. Comparative constitutional jurisprudence fails to record
a single instance in which a constitutional norm has been made retroactive.1la
It is granted that, by constitutional amendment, judicial review of certain
categories of legislative acts could be withdrawn from the Constitutional Court,
or judicial review as an institution abolished altogether. But no such with-
drawal, by a mere statement of the qualified majorities, could be made for
an individual controversy which is pending sub judice. Such an action is a
clear violation of article 101(1) of the Basic Law which protects everyone
against a denial of the right to appear before "his lawful judge." In order to
withdraw the exempted category of international treaties from judicial re-
view, the legislature, in conformity with article 79(1), would have had to
write an explicit exception into the general rule of article 93(2), which assigns
to the Court all disputes over the constitutionality of federal law. Had the
nett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922) (19th Amendment) ; National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350
(1920) (18th Amendment).
German constitutional lawyers were curiously reticent about the legality of the amend-
ment. But cf. Curtius, Die Verfasmungmtovelle vore 26. Maerz 1954 und die Schranken der
Verfassungsrevision, 7 DIE OxEzTLICrIE VERWALTUNG 623 (1954) ; Ehmke, Verfassungs-
aenderung und Verfassungsdurchbrechung, 79 ARCHIV DES OEFENTLICUIEN RECWrs 385,
410-18 (1954) ; Grewe, Betrachtungen, DEUTSCIIES VERWALTUNGSBLATr 114 (1954) ; Loe-
wenstein, Kritsche Bemwrkungen zur Verfassungsaendernng vore 26. Maer 195,4, 7 Din
OEFFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG 385 (1954) ; Sternberger, Alts dcm Bundcsrat; Annahme
mit Nuancen, DIE GEGENWART 196 (1954). The author submitted a legal opinion on the
validity of the constitutional amendment to the Court, which was attached to the opposi-
tion's brief of June 8, 1954.
111, In its original version the amendment revealed its retroactive character even more
openly in that its entering into force was backdated to March 1, 1953, to emasculate the
arguments of the opposition and desfroy the jurisdiction of the Court over their petition,
But the coalition parties thought it wise to camouflage their intention in more general
phraseology.
112. BAsIc LAW art. 103 (2).
113. Cf. Giese, Koennen Verfassungsgesetze sich rucckzeirkendc Kraft beilelen?, 7
DiE OEFFENTLICIE VERWALTUNG 321-24 (1954).
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constitutional amendment, therefore, amended article 93(2) to state that the
Court has jurisdiction "in cases of differences of opinion or on the formal and
material compatibility of federal law or Land law with this Basic Law, with
the exception of specified types of international trcaties," the withdrawal of
such treaties from the jurisdiction of the Court would have been constitutionally
unobjectionable, at least as to future cases. This textual change, however, was
strangely omitted. Article 142a, thus, in itself is a violation of the binding
rule of article 79(1) that constitutional amendments must be written into
the text of the Basic Law.
Moreover, Article 142a is at variance with the principle of the separation of
functions 4 -an unalterable provision of the Basic Law.Y By declaring that
the provisions of the Basic Law do not stand in the way of the EDC treaties,
the Parliament resolved a case then pending before the Court instead of allow-
ing it to proceed to judicial decision. Thus the Parliament, under guise
of a constitutional amendment, appropriated a judicial function reserved to
the Court.10
Finally, the opposition in its briefs and through some of the legal opinions
submitted on its behalf, argued that an individual exception to an otherwise
valid constitutional norm, even if accepted by constitutional amendment and
recorded in the text of the Constitution, is illegal per se. This objection was
primarily directed at the amendment to article 79(1) which exempts certain
international treaties from the provision that amendments can only be made
by altering the text of the Basic Law, but it could be raised as well to article
142a.
The argument touches on one of the most controversial subjects of consti-
tutional jurisprudence under both Weimar and Bonn.117 A deviation, it is
contended, in an individual case from a general constitutional norm is in
conflict with the quality of the constitution as fundamental law ordering
the community. Many opponents of such "perforation" of a constitutional rule
refer to metajuridical speculation on the character of the constitution as a
supra-positivist "decision," or, in more intelligible terms, they assert a moral
authority in the document, which does not brook opportunistic deflections in
individual cases. While this approach may find support in the fact that article
79(3) protects certain constitutional principles even 'against constitutional
amendment, one may as easily conclude from 79(3) that all other provisions
of the Basic Law are subject to constitutional amendment whether by abolition
or alteration in all cases, or only by suspension in an individual case. For the
positivist school there is no ground on which the constituent power can be
114. BAsic LAw art. 20(2).
115. Id.art.79(3).
116. See Ehmke, supra note 110, at 412-13.
117. The literature under Weimar was substantial: see, e.g., HAv,, DiE SCU1RA::KE:;
DER "VERFASSUNGSMEUISION (1947); LOEwENSTEIN, ERSCHEINUINGSFORMEN VER V~MFASS-
UNGSAENDERL'NxG 164-90, 233-304 (1931); Curtius, Book Revieze, 79 Ancuiv rS oF,-
FEKTLIcHE. REcHTS 510 (1954). Forothe situation under Bonn, see Ehmke, supra ,rute
110; EHamKE, GRENZEN DER VERFASSUNGSAENDERUNG (1953).
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prevented from making exceptions to its own rules if duly recorded in tile
text of the Basic Law. Otherwise the constituent power might not be in a
position to meet emergency situations where exceptions to constitutional rules
may be imperative. All that is required by the Basic Law is that the exception
be carried by a formal constitutional amendment and duly recorded in the
text of the Basic Law.
The opposition also contended that the treaty bills were invalid despite
whatever absolution the constitutional amendment provided. The treaty bills
had been passed by the first Federal Assembly, but they remained constitution-
ally uncompleted during the lifetime of that body because the Federal Presi-
dent failed to sign and promulgate them." 8 It is a rule common to all states
possessing democratic parliaments with recurrent elections that a bill not
completed before the expiration of the legislative term of the parliament which
passed it becomes defunct." 9 The elections of September 6, 1953, brought a
new Federal Assembly into being, so that when the Federal President, with
the counter-signature of the Government, later signed the treaty bills he dis-
regarded the principle of the "discontinuity of legislative periods." The proper
procedure would have been for the Government to submit the bills to the
second Federal Assembly for repassage and then refer them to the President
for signature and promulgation. But because world opinion had become rest-
less and because the opposition could have delayed the bills for months in
committee and in the plenary sessions, their resubmission was politically inop-
portune. The constitutional amendment declaring the bills passed by a defunct
Parliament not to be violative of the Basic Law did not cure the defect caused
by regarding Parliament as a continuous body.
To summarize the foregoing analysis of the constitutional amendment of
March 26, 1954: The creation of a federal military power by amending the
Basic Law is fully legal, and it provides a constitutional basis for transfer
of military forces to international organizations under article 24(1). That part
of the amendment which exempts certain international treaties in conflict with
Basic Law from the requirement of textual recordation in the constitution is
a loi d'accasion, perhaps reprehensible and unfortunate, yet not unconstitu-
tional. But the new article 142a by which the Court was deprived ex post
facto of its jurisdiction over questions of the constitutionality of the treaties,
is clearly unconstitutional. Thus, the treaties themselves would seem not to
have been ratified in accordance with the Basic Law, and, hence, were devoid
of legal force.
The Aftermath of the Constitutional Amendment
After the constitutional amendment of March 26, 1954, had become effec-
tive and the Federal President had promulgated the treaties and thereby con-
118. BA sIc LAw art. 82(1).
119. In addition to the unwritten practice of tlje United States and Great Britain, see
the explicit provision in DENMARK CONST. OF 1953 art. 41(4).
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verted them into the law of the land, the Government evidently felt that the
case before the Court was dead. It even disdained answering the opposition's
briefs except to contest the petitioners' right to continue the suit. This con-
tention was not wholly devoid of merit. By Basic Law and statute, suit con-
cerning the compatibility of federal law with the Basic Law can be brought
by the Federal Government, a Land Government, or one-third of the mem-
bership of the Federal Assembly.'- While the 144 members of the Assembly
had constituted the requisite one-third when they filed their final petition on
May 11, 1953, the 147 petitioners continuing the proceedings fell short of
constituting one-third of the newly elected Assembly with 487 members.
Moreover, not all of them were identical with the original petitioners. But,
in the absence of a constitutional or a statutory provision, a constitutional
controversy need not necessarily expire because the petitioners lose their
capacity to file a new suit, and at any rate, it would seem the issue should be
decided by the Court.
The Court, however, remained completely inactive, possibly for the same
political reasons that the Government chose to ignore the pending case. By
presidential promulgation the treaties had become final. Any subsequent in-
validation by the Court of the treaties themselves or the constitutional amend-
ment legalizing them,'-" would have reopened the Pandora's box of German
ratification, a politically undesirable occurrence, the responsibility for which
the Court understandably was indisposed to take. Consequently it procrasti-
nated. This policy paid ample if anticlimactic dividends. When the French
National Assembly failed to ratify, the proceedings before the Court together
with the treaties became moot. At the time of this writing (April, 1954)
the petition has not been withdrawn by the plaintiffs,' -"2 but there is not even
a remote prospect of the case being decided by the Court on its substantive
merits.
Similar questions were again before the Federal Constitutional Court
in proceedings instituted by the opposition 123 challenging the constitutionality
of the Saar Agreement,' 24 an essential element of the network of treaties
forming the Paris and London Accords, which are designed to replace
120. BAsic LAw art. 93(1) para. 2; Law on the Federal Constitutional Court § 76.
121. Because the Social Democratic Party no longer held one-third of the Assembly
seats, it could not make a direct attack on the constitutionality of the amendment, but
could only raise the issue collaterally in the pending controversy concerning the treaties.
122. Letter from Dr. Adolf Arndt, legal counsel for the plaintiffs, to Karl Luevenstein,
Sept. 29, 1954, copy on file in Yale Law Library.
123. The petitioners reached the constitutionally required minimum of one-third of
the total membership of the Federal Assembly when the 151 Social Democrats were j.,incd
by seven dissident Free Democrats, four members of the German Bloc and one Independent.
not to mention the eleven Social Democrats from Western Berlin whose capacity t., bring
suit was doubtful in view of their status as mere observers in the Federal Assembly with-
out voting rights under BASic LAw art. 144(2).
124. The text of the Saar Agreement appears in N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1954, p. 4, c.46.
1-5. The Agreement, along with the other treaties constituting the I.undun and Paris
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EDC.1 25 Because of the constitutional amendment of March 26, 1954, no
constitutional objection could be made to the central agreements of the new
defense scheme, which will allow the rearmament of Western Germany and
admit it into the Brussels Treaty of 1948 and into NATO. But the agree-
ment between France and the German Federal Republic "Europeanizing"
the Saar territory politically and integrating it economically with France was
the object of several new attacks based on the Basic Law. The opposition
contended that the Saar Agreement destroys the right of the Saarlanders,
under article 23, to accede to the Basic Law at a future date. Moreover, in
violation of article 146, the Agreement makes impossible the participation of
Saarlanders in an all-German constituent assembly. 120 Finally, the Statute
on the Saar Territory 127 was alleged to violate the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 128 in providing
that criticism of the Statute is permissible only during the three-month period
preceding its ratification by referendum, and that after ratification no chal-
lenge of the Europeanized status of the territory can be made until the con-
clusion of a final peace treaty with Germany-an event which may never
come. Since the Convention on Human Rights embodies "general rules of
international law," it cannot, by Basic Law article 25, be modified by statute
or treaty. However sound these objections were on their constitutional merits,
the Court's task of sailing between the Scylla of relinquishing Germany's
claim to the Saar and the Charybdis of sabotaging Germany's integration
into the Western defense system was a difficult one. Its treatment of the EDC
treaties stood as an ominous portent, and, as might have been expected, the
Court on May 4, 1955, dismissed the petition of the opposition. 12
EPILOGUE: A POST MORTEM
In this tournament of jurisprudential wits the Government and its lawyers
won hands down. Every legal threat which placed in jeopardy the Govern-
Accords, were ratified by simple majorities of the Federal Assembly, acting on the assump-
tion that no constitutional amendment was necessary. The Free Democrats joined the
opposition in voting against the Agreement. N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1955, p. 1, col. 8. The
Federal Council earlier decided that the treaties did not affect states' rights and hence did
not require its formal approval, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1954, p. 6, col. 3, and on March 18,
1955, passed the treaty bills by a substantial majority. N.Y. Times, March 19, 1955, p. 1,
col. 6.
125. See S. ExEc. Doc. L & M, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954). For analysis of the
London and Paris Accords, see Kunz, The London and Paris Agreements on West Ger-
many, 49 Am. J. INT'L L. 210 (1955) ; Bishop, The "Contractual Agrecments" with the
Federal Republic of Germany, id. at 125; Briggs, The Final Act of the London Conference
on Germany, id. at 148.
126. BAsic LAw art. 146 preserves this right to all German nationals. Id. art. 1 l
defines German national broadly enough to include the Saarlanders.
127. DRUCKSACIIEN DES BUNDESTAGES, 2. WAHLPERII iDE, No. 1062 (1953).
128. For text, see 45 Am. J. INeT'L L. 24-39 (Supp. 1951).
129. N.Y. Times, May 5, 1955, p. 1, col. 7.
[Vol. 64: 805
THE BONN CONSTITUTION
ment's grand design for Germany's integration into Western defense was
victoriously repulsed. Yet to one observer it seems that the Government won
a Pyrrhic victory. Left injured on the battlefield are practically all protago-
nists. The opposition's right to be an effective opposition was frustrated.
The political neutrality of the Federal President was damaged when he with-
drew his request for an advisory opinion. The Federal Council suffered loss
of prestige by its political meanderings. And finally, the Federal Constitu-
tional Court and German constitutional democracy were losers.
There is no gainsaying that the Court was placed in a most difficult posi-
tion. The issue that faced it was whether the Basic Law stood in the way
of a policy decision of paramount importance, on which the Government, sup-
ported by an overwhelming majority of the Federal Assembly, had staked
Germany's future. There was no doubt that under the Basic Law the case
was justiciable. But in impartially applying the law the political responsibility
of the judiciary was taxed beyond its limits. The Court was on safe legal
ground when it refused to adjudicate before the enactment of the treaties by
the parliamentary bodies had been completed. But what would have been the
situation had the Court thereafter invalidated the treaties? A decision de-
manding a constitutional amendment-which at that time was unobtainable--
would have styrnied the Government's European policy. Public opinion in
the West, particularly in the United States, would hardly have distinguished
judicial morality from political ill-will.130 Germany would have stood accused
of torpedoing European solidarity. Moreover, an irate government and parlia-
ment, after the election victory of September, 1953, might not have hesitated
to take its revenge and trim the Court's powers or abolish judicial review
altogether. Perhaps it was the better part of valor for the Court to drag its
feet and wait for the impending elections after which the issue could be re-
solved by constitutional amendment. judiciously waiting, the judiciary saved
its face and, perhaps, its neck.
And yet, with full understanding of the Court's quandary one may wonder
if judicial restraint has not been bought too dearly. In the first major politi-
cal test of its usefulness the Court has been found wanting. A great oppor-
tunity to live up to the expectations of the Basic Law was sacrificed to e.\tra-
judicial considerations.
130. The international validity of a domestically unconstitutional treaty is a highly
controversial subject. See, e.g., BroNDEAU, LA SuBoRDiiATioN DES CoNsnruvo: s AUX
NoRnEs INTENATiONALF.s (1932) ; CowrYs, TREATIES AND CONSTUIO:AL LAw (1941) ;
Mmrnq-GuELtzvITcH, DROiT CONSTrTUTIONNEL INTEMNATIONAL 164-66 (1933); Jenks,
The Present Status of the Bennett Ratification of International Labour ConvenLions, 15
CAN. B. P v. 464 (1937). The American and Swiss practice upholds the validity of inter-
national treaties which contravene internal constitutional law, particularly the federal-state
relations. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) ; Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416
(1920) ; Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dal.) 199 (1796) ; 1 GI.woMmrnL, SClIWtMIZRlIs S
BUNDESTAATSRECHT 809 et seq. (1949); 1 GUGGENHEIm, LEiuTRcui ms VotF~x_1FiITz
277 (1948).
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This is all the more surprising since the Court, during the three years
following its inauguration, consistently had grown in stature and was firmly
on the way of fixing itself in the popular mind as the true custodian of Bonn's
democratic values. Its jurisprudential authority, as evidenced by its previous
decisions, need not fear comparison with any other high court. 13 ' Testimonials
to its democratic courage are the decisions outlawing under article 21 of the
Basic Law the neo-Nazi Socialist Reich Party 132 and the so-called "Article
131 decisions." The latter declared that all appointments of public officials
had been terminated with unconditional surrender, that former Nazi officials
did not have a right to be reinstalled in their former positions, and that their
permanent dismissal does not violate the fundamental right of equality before
the law. 133 With these decisions the Court boldly defied the hallowed tradi-
tion of the sacrosanct and vested rights of German officials and professional
army officers to their office. Had the Weimar Constitutional Court exhibited
in time the same democratic energy it is safe to say that Weimar would not
have perished.
Why, then, has the Federal Constitutional Court so lamentably faltered?
Possibly the failure should be attributed less to the Court than to the Bonn
Constitution itself. Passing on the supreme policy decisions of the Govern-
ment may exceed the judicial capacity of any court: in judicializing political
power the Bonn instrument may have gone beyond reasonable limits. But
the effects of the Court's delinquency or deficiency in acting as the constitu-
tionally appointed guardian were not confined to the Court itself. The pro-
cedural treatment of this basic controversy hardly increased the respect of
131. See the excellent review of the work of the court during the first two years by
Mercker, Zwei Jahre Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, BVNDESANZ1G
Nos. 206, 226, 243 (1953) ; No. 24 (1954). An authoritative review of the Court's activi-
ties until 1954 is presented by one of its members, Judge Federer, Die Rechtspreehuny des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts zuin Grundgesetc fiter die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 3
JAHRBUCH DES OEFFENTLICHEN RECHTS (Neue Folge) 15 (1954), with an extensive
bibliography, id. at 58-66, and a discussion of the controversy treated here, id. at 50-53.
132. Judgment of Bundesverfassungsgericht (I. Senat), Oct. 23, 1952, 2 B.V.G. 1.
133. This right is guaranteed by BAsIC LAw art. 3(1).
Altogether five parallel decisions (for different categories of office holders) were
handed down on December 17, 1953. Judgments of Bundesverfassungsgericht (I. Senlat),
Dec. 17, 1.953, 3 B.V.G. 58, 162, 187, 208, 213. The sixth decision applied the same prin-
ciples to members of the armed forces. Judgment of Bundesverfassungsgericht (I. Senat),
Feb. 26, 1954, 3 B.V.G. 288. The decisions, binding all other governmental organs includ-
ing the courts (Law on the Federal Constitutional Court § 31) were violently attacked,
even by a plenary decision of the Supreme Federal Court, the court of the last instance in
non-constitutional matters. Judgment of Bundesgerichtshof (Grosser Senat fuer Zivil-
sachen), May 20, 1954, 13 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen 265. For
a general appraisal of the resultant chasm in the German judiciary, see Peters, Der Streit
urn die 13er Entscheidumgen des Bundesverassungsgerichts, [1954] JuRIsTrzNzErvNa 589.
589.
Seventeen legal opinions opposing the decisions of the Court are published in Schriften-
reihe des Deutschen Beantenbundes, Sonderheft, DIE WISSENSCUlAT ZUM S-UCl VOTn
KARLSRTUHE (1954). See, also, Federer, supra note 131, at 57-58.
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the burgher for his Basic Law and the democratic values it purports to em-
body, while it deeply embittered the eight million voters of the Social Demo-
cratic Party, about one-third of the total electorate. Once again, a willful
govermnent-Obrigkeit is the historic German term-supported by a majori-
ty in parliament, as obedient to the Chancellor as it was arrogant toNward the
minority, demonstrated to the German people that it could bend the Consti-
tution at its will and get away with it. The situation is ominously reminiscent
of Bismarck's conflict with the progressive majority of the Prussian diet in
the 1860's when the chancellor of "blood and iron" treated the constitution
as a scrap of paper and vindicated himself by winning two wars of aggres-
sion. Vestigia terrent.
But the melancholy story does not end there. The briefs and legal opinions
submitted on behalf of the Government indicate that official constitutional
jurisprudence has assumed a familiar German role. Seeking to prove that
rearmament is legal without constitutional amendment, the ministerial bureau-
cracy and its bevy of legal experts went far beyond what the ars argumenta-
tiva of the advocate of a just cause could have warranted. Again the authori-
tarian nature of German constitutional tradition, its secret yearning for the
strong government, its penchant for a state mystique above the positive law,
broke through the paper thin veneer of democratic convictions to which lip
service is paid. The very structure of the Bonn Constitution, demo-authori-
tarian at best, 4 gave full rein to the belief that the Government can do no
wrong. By any democratic standards, this revealing self-portrait of official
constitutional jurisprudence is unattractive. Its only redeeming feature is the
opposition's honest belief that, if democratic fundamentals are to be taken
seriously, all government must be strictly limited government, and the Con-
stitution the supreme law of the land.
The ultimate consequences which this monumental case of judicial frus-
tration will have for the democratic future of Germany are hard to foresee.
While it lasted, the controversy aroused intense public interest. Possibly.
the notorious indifference of the German people toxvards the Basic Law wail,
in the long run, cancel out the potential injury the Constitution has suffered.
Possibly, however, this precedent of converting expediency into law will con-
stitute again the entering wedge for governmental authoritarianism for which
the Constitution serves as a cloak rather than a brake.
134. See Loewenstein, The Government and Politics of Germany, in Goi&mmaMT-
oF CONTINENTAL EuxoPE 580 (Shotwell rev. ed. 1952).
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